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GO WORLD

Winter 1998-99 NO. 84

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by Iwamoto Kaoru

In November 1970, an unheard of 21-year-old 7-dan won his way into the Honinbo league. There, over the next 6 months, he beat some of the strongest go players in the world to earn the right to challenge Rin Kaiho for the Honinbo title.

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The cover: The front and back covers of an Edo era story illustrated by Toyokuni. The animal in the foreground is probably a monkey.

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Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

GO WORLD NEWS

News from Japan

Besides Cho Chikun, the undisputed king of the Japanese go world for the last three years, the big newsmakers in 1998 have been O Rissei and Kobayashi Koichi. O started off the year by winning the international LG Cup (see *GW83* for a complete report). He then went on to win both the Honinbo and Meijin leagues to challenge Cho for these titles. Although unsuccessful in both bids, he did manage to pick up the Oza title in December to complete his most successful year to date.

Kobayashi, who has been in a slump since the illness and death of his wife Reiko, seems to be on the comeback trail. For the last year he has been without a title, but on December 19 he took the Tengen title. He also will be challenging Cho for the Kisei title starting in January. This rejuvenation may be due to his recent marriage. With his domestic life again stable, he can now concentrate all his energies on the go board. Below is a report on these and other events.

The 23rd Meijin title match

Cho defeats O Rissei

Cho Chikun defeated O Rissei by 1 1/2 points in the seventh game of the title match on November 12, 1998. By defending this title and defeating O for the second time this year in a best-of-seven match, Cho has maintained his hegemony of the top three titles and leaves no doubt in anyone's mind that he is the top player in Japan.

O got off to a good start by winning the first

game. But then Cho got into gear and took the next two games. In the fourth game, Cho was clearly in the lead until he let O get a big territorial framework in exchange for capturing a group. Cho was still ahead, but then he made a slip in defending one of his groups. He had to start and win a ko if he was going to pull the game out. But then a double ko, which had been lying dormant in another part of the board, came to life. In other words, the game turned into a triple ko. Neither side could yield and, when the same position repeated itself for the third time, a no-result was declared. This is the first time that a triple ko has occurred in a title match and it is the fourth time in Cho's career that one of his games has ended in a no-result.

O then won the fifth game (Michael Redmond analyzes the opening of that game starting on page 43) to even the series, but Cho won the sixth and seventh games to defend his title.

The results of the match:

Game One (Sept. 9 & 10, 1998). Cho resigned.

Game Two (Sept. 23 & 24). O resigned.

Game Three (Sept. 30 & Oct. 1). O resigned.

Game Four (Oct. 14 & 15). No result.

Game Five (Oct. 21 & 22). O won by 3 1/2 points.

Game Six (Nov. 4 & 5). Cho won by 3 1/2 points.

Game Seven (Nov. 11 & 12). Cho won by 1 1/2 points.

Incidentally, Cho scored his 1,000th win in Game Six of this match (see Tengen report below).



O Rissei (left) takes the Oza title from Yamada Kimio.



Kobayashi Koichi (left) defeats Kudo Norio for the Tengen title; his first big seven title in three years.

O Rissei wins the Oza title

In his third challenge this year, O finally succeeded in taking a major Japanese title. He defeated the title holder Yamada Kimio to capture the Oza title. Three years ago he won this title from Cho Chikun, but he lost it the following year to Ryu Shikun. The results of the title match:

Game One (Oct. 29, 1998). Yamada resigned.

Game Two (Nov. 16). Yamada resigned.

Game Three (Dec. 3). Yamada resigned.

Kobayashi Koichi takes the Tengen title

At the age of 57, Kudo Norio was considered too old to take a major title like the Tengen. But this he did when he defeated Ryu Shikun (3-1) last year. When Kobayashi became the challenger this year, everyone expected him to make short work of Kudo, but the title holder put up strong resistance and the match went the full distance. After the fourth game, both players had two wins and the result of the match hung on the last game. Until the endgame, Kobayashi had a bad game and expected to lose. 'I could see no way of winning,' he admitted. However, Kudo made a couple of slack moves and Kobayashi went on to win by 11 1/2 points. This is the third time Kobayashi has held the Tengen title, the last time being 11 years ago.

The fifth game marked another milestone for Kobayashi: it was the 1,000th win of his career as a professional, matching Cho's achievement of a month earlier (see Meijin report above). It is interesting to note just how closely matched these two rivals are. When Kobayashi reached this milestone,

he had 472 losses and four draws, while Cho had 471 loses, three draws, and four no-results. Kobayashi's winning percentage at that point was 67.75% and Cho's was 67.65%. (The only other players to have scored 1,000 wins have been Sakata, Rin Kaiho, and Kato Masao, who did so in 1996.) By winning this match, Kobayashi also brought his swag of titles up to 46, putting him in third place behind Sakata (64) and Cho (58).

The results of the match:

Game One (Nov. 5). Kudo won by 1 1/2 points.

Game Two (Nov. 12). Kudo resigned.

Game Three (Dec. 3). Kudo resigned.

Game Four (Dec. 10). Kudo won by 6 1/2 points.

Game Five (Dec. 17). Kobayashi won by 11 1/2 points.

The 23rd Kisei title

Kobayashi Koichi becomes the challenger

In the best-of-three playoff to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun for the Kisei title, Kobayashi Koichi beat Yoda Norimoto 2-0. Kobayashi lost the Kisei title, which he held for eight consecutive terms, to Cho four years ago. Kobayashi is one of the few players to have defeated Cho in a best-of-seven match. He is also one of the most experience (after Cho and Rin) in best-of-seven matches (18 to Cho's 31 and Rin's 29).

The results of the playoff:

Game One (Oct. 29, 1998). Kobayashi won by 3 1/2 points.

Game Two (Nov. 19). Kobayashi won by 1/2 points.

The 54th Honinbo League (Title-holder: Cho Chikun)

Rank		OR	OM	HN	KS	YK	IA	CS	RS	Won	Lost
1	O Rissei			○		●			●	2	1
2	O Meien				●		●	●		0	3
3	Hikosaka Naoto	●				○			●	1	2
4	Kobayashi Satoru		○				●	●		1	2
5	Yamada Kimio	○		●					●	1	2
5	Ishida Akira		○		○			●		2	1
5	Cho Sonjin		○		○		○			3	0
5	Ryu Shikun	○		○		○				3	0

The first game of the match will be played in Paris on January 13 and 14, 1999.

The 54th Honinbo league

The Honinbo league, to determine the challenger to Cho Chikun next May, began on October 3, 1998. The last four players in the chart were the survivors of the third preliminary elimination tournament. This is Ishida Akira's first appearance in this league.

The Honinbo league is usually a dog-eat-dog affair. It often happens that a player in contention to become the challenger after the pentultimate round can get dropped from the league if he loses his last game, depending on the results of the other players. After three rounds, all the top-ranked players have at least two losses, while Cho Sonjin and Ryu Shikun, ranked at the bottom, have clean slates with three wins each. With four rounds to go, it is anybody's guess who will become the challenger.

The 24th Meijin league

The 24th Meijin league began on December 10, 1998. The results as of December 24, 1998:

Yoda Norimoto beat Kobayashi Satoru.

Ryu Shikun 7-dan beat Kato Masao.

Mimura Tomoyasu 8-dan beat Takemiya Masaki.

Sakai Maki 6-dan beat Kobayashi Koichi.

O Rissei had the bye.

Our readers might be interested in learning that Sakai Maki is a disciple of Kobayashi Koichi.

Ohira Shuzo (1930-1998)

We regret to inform our readers of the death of Ohira Shuzo who died on December 11, 1998 of a heart attack. Ohira was born on March 16, 1930 and became a disciple of Kitani Minoru at the age of 11. He became 1-dan in 1947 and 9-dan in 1963.

In 1960 he won the Kodansha tournament and, from 1966 to 1969, won the Nihon Ki-in Championship (the forerunner of the Tengen title) four times in a row. He then won it again in 1972.

Ohira had a history of heart trouble and the day before he died he had gone to the hospital for a regular check-up. On the way back, he stopped off at the Nihon Ki-in to watch the games in progress. That evening when he returned home, he was in excellent spirits and told his wife about the many games he watched and how he could hardly wait to play his next game.

International News

The 3rd LG Cup

In the quarter finals held on October 26, the two favorites, Ma Xiaochun and Lee Chang-ho advanced to the semifinals. Ma beat Cho Chikun and Lee beat Chou Chun-hsun of Taiwan. In the two other games Yu Bin (China) beat Kudo Norio the Japan Tengen, and Shao Weigang (China) beat Yamada Kimio, the Japan Oza. The semifinals and final will be in February in Seoul.

3rd Samsung Cup

Ma and Lee again in the final

The quarterfinals of the 3rd Samsung Cup were held on October 9, 1998 in Seoul. The following players made it to the semifinals: Ma Xiaochun, Ryu Shikun, Lee Chang-ho, and Cho Chikun.

The semifinals were held on November 2. The results in that round:

Ma Xiaochun beat Ryu Shikun.

Lee Chang-ho beat Cho Chikun.

The first game of the best-of-five final was

played on November 26. Ma won that game when Lee resigned after 159 moves.

The second to fifth games were supposed to have been played in the week of December 14, but because of the players' busy schedules, the remaining games were rescheduled to begin on February 1, 1999. A full report on this match will appear in our next issue.

A Chinese-sponsored world championship

A new world championship tournament, called the Spring Orchid Cup, was announced recently. It will offer a first prize of about ¥18,000,000. The tournament will be limited to 24 players: nine from China, six from Japan, five from Korea, and four from other areas. It will consist of a double-elimination tournament with a best-of-three final. Eight players will be seeded into the second round. A preliminary tournament was held from November 7 to 9 to choose the Chinese players. The top 40 ranked Chinese players were eligible to play. The following players won the right to compete in the first round: Yu Bin 9-dan, Song Xuelin 9-dan, Shao Weigang 9-dan, Zhou Heyang 7-dan, Shao Zhengzhong 9-dan, and Qiu Jun 4-dan. By the recommendation of the Chinese Weiqi Association, the following players will be seeded into the second round: Nie Weiping, Chang Hao 8-dan, and Ma Xiaochun.

The first round was held on December 25. The results were:

Yu Bin beat Chou Chun-hsun (Taipei).
Mok Jin-suk (Korea) beat Shao Zhengzhong.
Shao Weigang beat Michael Redmond (USA).
Yoda Norimoto (Japan) beat Taranu Catalin (Europe).
Zhou Heyang beat Yamada Kimio (Japan).
Lin Sheng-shien (Taipei) beat Kudo Norio (Japan).
Yuki Satoshi (Japan) beat Song Xuelin.
Choi Myung-hoon (Korea) beat Qiu Jun.

The results of the second round held on December 28 are:

Yu Bin beat Lee Chang-ho (Korea).
Chang Hao (China) beat Mok Jin-suk.
Shao Weigang beat Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea).
Yoda Norimoto (Japan) beat Ma Xiaochun.
Zhou Heyang beat Hikosaka Naoto (Japan).
O Rissei (Japan) beat Lin Shengshien.
Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea) beat Yuki Satoshi.
Choi Myung-hoon (Korea) beat Nie Weiping.

News from China

11th Mingren (Meijin) title match

The 11th Mingren title match was held from October 14 to November 20. Ma Xiaochun defeated the challenger Liu Xiaoguang 3-2 to hold on to this title for the 10th consecutive year.

The Chinese Kisei title established

It was recently announced that the Chinese Kisei title has been established. The tournament will be structured along the same lines as the Japanese Kisei tournament, with each dan up to 7-dan having a champion. The dan champions will then play in a dan championship and the winner will gain a place in the final tournament. The 8- and 9-dans also have their own preliminary tournaments for gaining places in the final tournament, in which some of the more famous Chinese players will be seeded. On page 37, we present a game from the 9-dan tournament.

News from Korea

The following is a round-up of the top Korean titles contested over the last four months. Lee Chang-ho and Cho Hoon-hyun continue to dominate the tournament scene there.

33rd Pae Wang (Monarch) title match

Cho Hoon-hyun defeated Lee Sung-jae 5-dan 3-2 on September 11, 1998.

The 29th Myungin (Meijin) title match

Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 3-1 on October 30, 1998.

The 3rd Tekron Cup

Lee Chang-ho defeated Choi Myung-hoon 3-0 on October 14, 1998.

The 3rd Chun Won (Tengen) title match

Lee Chang-ho defeated Choi Myung-hoon 3-1 on October 30, 1998. This title is also known as the Bacchus Cup.

The 42nd Guksu (National Champion)

Cho Hoon-hyun defeated Lee Chang-ho in this best-of-three match 2-0 on November 17, putting a stop to Lee's run of five successive victories in this title.

The 53rd Honinbo Title Match

Cho Chikun breaks Takagawa's record



O Rissei and Cho Chikun conduct the nigiri at the start of the title match.

For over three decades Takagawa's record of nine successive Honinbo titles (from 1952 to 1960) was considered one of those records that would never be broken, at least in a top title (with two-day games in the title match). The strongest contender seemed to be Sakata Eio, the player who was Takagawa's nemesis and who ended his reign as Honinbo, but then he was dethroned by Rin Kaiho after seven successive terms as Honinbo. Since then no one had won more than five Honinbo titles in a row.

Kobayashi Koichi made two attempts on the record in other titles, but his Kisei run ended after eight terms and his Meijin one after seven.

After winning the Honinbo title in 1989, however, Cho Chikun started compiling an awesome record and in 1997 he finally drew level with Takagawa, so in 1998 he was shooting for an unprecedented 10th successive term as Honinbo. He was also trying to extend his reign as the holder of the Triple Crown: he had won the Kisei, Meijin

and Honinbo titles in 1996 and 1997 and had started off 1998 by defending the Kisei. The next step was to keep the Honinbo, then defend the Meijin in the autumn (as the reader knows from our news section, he succeeded in this).

The unenviable task of trying to prevent Cho from setting this record fell to O Rissei. However, he was probably not daunted, as he had often done well against Cho in the past: he was one of the few players with a plus record against Cho, even though it was just by one, at 17 wins to 16 losses prior to the title match. That included a 3-0 win against Cho in their only previous encounter in a title match, the 43rd Oza in 1995 (that was O's first top-seven title). His major handicap was that he was playing his first two-day games, whereas this was Cho's 30th big-three title match. Actually, O Rissei is a very fast player who rarely uses all of his time even in one-day games, in contrast to Cho, who really comes into his own with the extra time of the two-day games.

Honinbo Prize Money

Winner: ¥25,000,000

Loser: ¥5,000,000

Match fee — title holder: ¥6,300,000

— challenger: ¥4,150,000

To become the challenger, O Rissei had to defeat his fellow Taiwanese O Meien after they both ended the league with 5–2 scores. Rissei had thought he was out of contention when he started the league with one win to two losses, but after that he enjoyed marvelous form, not only winning all his remaining games but also defeating Korea's Yoo Chang-hyuk 3–2 in the final of the 2nd LG Cup. The playoff with Meien was held on April 6 and Rissei, playing black, won by 1½ points. Rissei was a little behind in the early middle game, but in bad positions he has an almost uncanny knack of finding do-or-die moves that throw a game into confusion, and quite a few of his wins are upsets. What that means is that he is a great middle-game fighter and that his positional judgement is so good that he knows how hard he has to fight.

Cho is no slouch when it comes to fighting either, so an exciting title match was guaranteed.

Cho Chikun in the Honinbo Title

36th (1981). Defeated Takemiya 4–2.

37th (1982). Defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4–2.

38th (1983). Lost to Rin Kaiho 4–3.

44th (1989). Defeated Takemiya 4–0.

45th (1990). Defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4–3.

46th (1991). Defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4–2.

47th (1992). Defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4–3.

48th (1993). Defeated Yamashiro 4–1.

49th (1994). Defeated Kataoka Satoshi 4–3.

50th (1995). Defeated Kato Masao 4–1.

51st (1996). Defeated Ryu Shikun 4–2.

52nd (1997). Defeated Kato Masao 4–0.

53rd (1998). Defeated O Rissei 4–2.

Played on May 15 & 16, 1998 in Shanghai.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1–36)

Figure 1 (1–36). *Playing the moyo game he dislikes*

Although they play different types of go, Rissei (we're good friends, so I refer to him by his given name in my commentaries) and Cho are both territorial players. So what are we to make of this game? Rissei finds himself willy-nilly forced to adopt the kind of thickness strategy that goes against his nature. This is yet more evidence of Cho's skill. He doesn't let an opponent play his favourite strategy.

Putting aside individual preference, however, we can say that the moves to 33 give a reasonable game.

The move that I can't fathom is White 34 — why is White being so cautious? Above all else, at least to my way of thinking, White must extend at A. Black will push down at B, but White ploughs on regardless with the two-step hane of C–Black D–White E. If this result is considered unsatisfactory, then White could answer Black B more patiently by attaching at F. In the game, White 20 becomes a bad move after Black hanes at 35. I think that permitting Black 35 is too painful.

Figure 2 (37–102) (next page). *Cho cuts the moyo down to size.*

I hear that in the players' review of the game White 40 was considered problematic. I agree. The players commented that White

Game One: O's bad start

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Komi: 5½; time: 8 hours each.

should have reinforced with 40 at 'a' in *Dia.* 1, but my first instinct would be to play White 1 to 7. Cho might invade at 'b'. If so, the players have to fight it out. The thickness White gets with 1 to 7 is bound to be of assistance.





Figure 2 (37-102)



Dia. 1: building thickness

When Black rushes in rudely with 41 and lives up to 53, the position is already disagreeable for White.

Black 63 makes miai of backtracking to 72 and plunging further in at 67. Rissei lamented that 'this one move completely wiped out the white moyo'. I was thinking of a different way of reducing the moyo. Black keeps the 61-62 exchange in reserve, ex-

changes Black 79 for White 83, then plunges in around Black 76. The Black 79-White 83 exchange aims at playing Black A, White 80, Black B, White C, Black D. This is more like the kind of strategy I would expect Cho to follow.

However, complications arise because of Black's extension at 83. If instead he had linked up along the edge with Black 100, the game would have been over.




Figure 3 (103-167)

Figure 3 (103-167). *Cho's groups don't die.*

Missing the connection lets White stage an incident. After White 12 to 16, this black group has only one eye. However, Cho had probably read it all out. He feints as if to connect to the top with 17 and 19, then, when White uses brute force to cut with 20 on, he links up to the bottom right up to 43.

Instead of 36, White would like to be able to offer more resistance, but his own group lacks eye shape and his prospects in a capturing race don't look good. White seems to have no choice about 36 and 38.

There may have been scope for complications if White had used 16 to jump to 19 or to connect at 44. I don't have space to give the variations here, but take my word for it that neither would have worked if Black had answered correctly. There was no way for White to win.

White resigns after Black 167.

(Kido, July 1998)

Game Two Countering the O Rissei Style

White: Cho Chikun

Black: O Rissei

Played in Sumoto City, Hyogo Prefecture,
on May 21 & 22, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.

O Rissei has undergone a painful initiation into top title play with successive losses to Cho Chikun. To be frank, I had thought, before the series began, that Cho, spurred on by his goal of setting a new record of ten successive titles, had the better chances. In five-hour games, Cho will sometimes carelessly lose to us other players, but not so in two-day games.

Rissei does have his own inimitable style and he can display impressive strength, as I know to my own cost. I thought it just possible that the Rissei style might disturb Cho's thought patterns. Once the series began, however, Cho skilfully nullified Rissei's strengths. He kept just out of range so that Rissei's punches did not hit home. It makes you realize anew just how strong Cho is. Let's take a close look at the second game to see how Cho does it.





Figure 1 (1-22)

Figure 1 (1-22). Give-and-take in the opening


Black 1 to 5, the so-called 'Kobayashi Koichi style', is Rissei's sure-win opening with Black. If White plays 6 at A, Rissei will play B at quite an early stage. He considers this move, neither too far from nor too close to the 3-5 enclosure, to be quite big.

Well aware that this is one of his opponent's favourite patterns, Cho tries a special strategy with 6. This 6 is not a new move, but it is unusual. It forestalls an approach move at C, limits the breadth of the bottom area, and also sets up the continuation of 22.



Dia. 1: White is not satisfied


White 10 and 12 also show that Cho is taking pains with his opening. He doesn't want to play the pincer of 1 in *Dia. 1* immediately. If the marked white stone were at 'a', then he could counter Black 6 with 'b'. With the low position of the marked stone, however, White 'b' does not make White's thickness at the top work enough.



Dia. 2: following orders

White therefore plays 10 to pre-empt Black 6 in the diagram. Realizing what White is up to, Black switches to 13 and 15.

However, I think that he could also have followed orders by playing 1 in *Dia. 2*. After 4, Black pincers at 5, and this is a reasonable game.




Dia. 3: White changes his strategy

When Black pincers at 5 in *Dia. 2*, he would prefer to have the marked stone at 'a', but you can't expect everything to go the way you want it to. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3*, White will probably play 2 and 4 instead of making a pincer at 'a'. Needless to say, White aims at playing at 'b' later.

These strategic complications are the background to the players' opening moves.

White 16. One is also tempted to slide at D, but there's a danger Black will harry White with Black E, White 16, Black F (not 17). That's why Cho played 16. Sometimes you have to pass up on a tempting move.



Dia. 4: not to Cho's liking

The conventional move for 22 is White 1 in *Dia. 4*, which Black will answer at 2. Cho didn't like the idea of this.

Figure 2 (23–40). *Why Black gets into trouble*

We have now come to the problematic

scene. An extension to A would be big for White, so you can say that Black 23 is the only move. But what about Black 25? When White attaches at 26, the only option Black is left with is trying to live with a hane at B or C. In other words, he is no longer able to fight strongly. My guess is that Black 25 made Cho happy by giving him the contact play of 26.






Figure 2 (23–40)

My instinctive move, irresponsible though it may be, is to invade at 1 in *Dia. 5*. The only thing is that I don't know what kind of fighting this will lead to. If White 2, Black pushes up with 3 and should be able to handle the fight. Would White be able to play 2 at 'a', making miai of the contact plays at 'b' and 3? Even if White did play 'a', I think that Black could get a much better result than in the game by countering with 'c' or 'd'. Whatever, I personally wanted to see Black play strongly by invading and seeing what Cho came up with in response.



Dia. 5: proper aggression




Dia. 6: second-best

Even if I make a major compromise on this, I still think that Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* would be better than what Black did in the game. White 4 is probably essential to forestall Black 'a', so Black can next crawl at 5, menacing White's corner. I just can't get over the feeling that Black 25 in the figure was slack.

While we're about it, I have doubts about the invasion of 27 too. White 28 becomes a perfect move. Black works hard to devise a counter with 29 and 31, but the blame for the adverse fight he is forced into can be placed on his play at this point.

Normally, Black would want to play 27 at D, targeting the three marked white stones. However, White would calmly defend at E, and I can't see the three white stones coming under a really severe attack. Not only that, the bottom area might be converted into white territory without further ado. That's why Black invaded at 27 — I understand his feelings.




Dia. 7: a good alternative


However, considering how tough the ensuing fight is for Black, he could also have considered capping at 1 in *Dia. 7*. This is quite a move — it makes miai of 2 and 3.

Rissei said that he had regrets about

blocking at 31. He wished he'd jumped to 1 in *Dia. 8*. However, I can't come up with any good continuation for Black after this. If Black wants to attack with 3, now is the time to do it, but after White 6, which threatens White 'a', Black is faced with a hard fight. Yet connecting at 1 in *Dia. 9* is too heavy; it invites the light move of White 2.



Dia. 8: prospects bad for Black



Dia. 9: an excellent light move

Starting with 25, the game has been developing badly for Black.

The monarch of Japanese go

Cho is the only player to have won the Triple Crown: the Kisei, Meijin and Honinbo titles in the same year (for that matter, no other player has won all three even in separate years). He first accomplished this feat in 1983, though only for half a year (for the first six weeks of this period he also held the fourth-ranked title, the Judan).

Cho's second reign as holder of the Triple Crown has proved more durable. It started in the autumn of 1996 when he won the Meijin title. This time there is no telling how long it will last. The first major theme of 21st century Japanese go is likely to be: who can dethrone Cho?





Figure 3 (41-66)

Figure 3 (41-66). A tangible lead for White

Cho tries out various different strategies in the fuseki. Moreover, he's good at it — probably the number one fuseki exponent on the current go scene. When you're playing him, you often find yourself in a tough position before you realize it, even though you've played no identifiably bad moves.

In a sense, Rissei has already lost to Cho in the fuseki of this game. By the time he became aware of it, he was already trailing.

White 42 in response to Black 41 is natural. The safety-first move on the right is to capture a stone with 1 in *Dia. 10*, providing Black can't do anything on the left. But he can: Black 2 to 10 make miai of the ladder at 'a' and the geta at 'b'.


*Dia. 10: 'safety-first' is safety-last*

Pulling out a stone with Black 43 looks like the inevitable course of play. As you can see, however, Cho blithely sacrifices


two stones and fixes up his shape at the bottom right. Even though the two white stones have been captured, they retain some effectiveness (later demonstrated in the game). On top of that, White gets thickness on the left, and Cho judges that this is good enough.

Rissei said that he should have played 43 at 45. However, it is unlikely that Black would get a better result — White would play A and the game would follow a different course.

More important, I find pushing up with 51 inexplicable. White 52 is sente, so White can block at 54, forcing Black to defend with 55 and 57. Note that if Black plays 53 at B, White gets a good continuation with C—Black 60—White D and is left with the peep of E.


*Dia. 11: better for 51*

Shouldn't Black have used 51 to crawl at 1 in *Dia. 11*? If White 2, Black plays 3 and White's shape crumbles. If instead White backtracks with 2 in *Dia. 12*, Black plays 3, then takes a firm grip on the two stones with 5. This result is superior to that in the game, in my opinion. It would be even nicer if Black could use 5 to slide at 'a'...

*Dia. 12: better for 51*


After White 58, Black can play one attacking move at 59, but the game now seems clearly favourable for White. At some indefinable point White has taken the lead. But there is no result without a cause. I

believe that the sources of Black's problems were 25 and 27 in Figure 2 and 51 in this figure.



Dia. 13: tewari analysis

White 66 is a good reinforcement. After 66, the result is equivalent to *Dia. 13*: White has made an excellent extension to 1, whereupon Black has exchanged 2-3 and 4-5. White 3 may look funny, but even so you can't say Black profits from these exchanges. Isn't that all the more reason, then, to go for profit by following *Dia. 14*, then to play 61 and 63? This would represent back-to-the-wall defiance and would, I think, create more chances for Black.



Dia. 14: defiantly taking profit

Figure 4 (67-100). Wrapping up the game

Black takes the most profitable point with 67, but turning at 72 makes White thick. White B and C are now sente, threatening White A.

Black reinforces at 77 because a move by White around D would be severe.

The sequence from White 78 to 84 builds thickness and, moreover, is sente. If Black ignores 78, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15* put him on the spot. Black 83 and 85 are necessary to forestall White 3 in the diagram.

Once Cho moves into the lead, he

doesn't easily relinquish it. Even when short of time, he plays with precision, as amply demonstrated in this game.





Figure 4 (67-100)







Figure 5 (101-148)

Figure 5 (101-148). Where has the Rissei style gone?

The flow of this game has become monotonous. Rissei's go is more radical or — to put it more bluntly — rougher. He has to play his usual style in order to send a chill down Cho's spine, but his failure to do so here lets Cho finish the game without experiencing the emotion of fear.

Danger looms for the right-side black group when White extends at 12 and cuts off the escape route with 14. All Black can hope to do if White attacks him strongly is to set up a capturing race with the top-right white group.

Black 25 is necessary in response to White 24. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 17* immediately, White can counter with 4 and 6 (after making the 26-27 exchange in the figure). Before playing 4, White will probably increase his liberties with 'a'. Note also that White can cut at 'b', making both White 'c' and 'd' sente.

*Dia. 17: disaster for Black*

White 28. If at White 29, a capturing race follows after Black A. However, White has ample territory, so he goes for safety-first with 28 and 30. White has been able to play the moves of 16 and 20, which are by no means small, in sente. His judgement is that he can be quite satisfied with having forced Black to make the unfavourable 15-18 exchange as preparation for the capturing race. Sure enough, when White blocks at 36, he is ahead on the board.

I think that this was an atypical and unsatisfying game for Rissei. It ended without his being able to bring his talents into play.

Black resigns after White 148.

(Kido, July 1998.)

Game Three: Raising the flag for the fightback

White: O Rissei

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on June 11 & 12, 1998 in Aomori City. *Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.*

Report by Akiyama Kenji.




Figure 1 (1-22)

Figure 1 (1-22). Cho gets what he wants.

I acted as referee for the first time in a best-of-seven title match. The referee's job is too easy. You just have to be present when the game starts and ends each day — even

an idiot could handle that. Since I felt bad about how easy my job was, I analysed the game. I can't pay the players the compliment of saying that this is a good game, but it has many interesting scenes. In particular, the psychological flow of the game is interesting.

Cho is putting in 'an order' when he plays just the approach move of 9 before switching back to 11 and 13. In effect, he's saying to White: you won't want to crawl at 15, will you? That means that 14 to 18 follow, and I assess this result as good for Black. If you divide the board into two halves, then Black has taken more of the top half and he has a satisfying position in the bottom half.

White 10 seems to be the cause of this. Shouldn't White try to counter Black's plan, attaching at A, for example, or taking up position with 12?




Figure 2 (23-41)

Figure 2 (23-41). *Is this a joke?*

Suddenly Cho starts acting funny: Black 23, 25, and 29. These three moves make a strong impression: namely, disbelief. I thought Cho had to be joking.


First, Black 23. This move tries to make a small increase in territory by extending from a strong position. White 24 is obviously more delicious. I think that it would have been much simpler to play 23 at Black 30, White A, Black B.

The same goes for 25 and 29. The com-

monsense move is Black 30 or Black C. If you look at Black's position to 29 at the bottom, anyone can see that Black has played submissively and is overconcentrated.

Cho has his own special world which can't be understood by ordinary mortals. The elements of personal preference and play are too pronounced. Cho plays one game like this in every series.

The aim of the invasion of 33 is not to lay waste to territory but to destroy the white position. Otherwise, Black's wall to 29 is of no use. However, it's not so easy to push White around.



Dia. 1: crude but profitable

I sense danger in O's 38. Shouldn't White just gratefully accept the opportunity to play the crude contact plays of 1 and 3 in Dia. 1? After Black 4, White secures a large territory with 5. Even if Black continues by making a ponnuki, White doesn't feel any pain. But if Black doesn't ponnuki, White's pulling out the stone will be troublesome. Cho said that he would have played 2 at 'a', but White answers at 4 and nothing bad will happen.

Cho spent one hour and 38 minutes on Black 41. Again, this is Cho's own unique world. The next figure shows what he was thinking about.







Figure 3 (42-71)
64: captures at 58



Dia. 2: what happens next?

Figure 3 (42-71). Stepping into a world of goblins and demons

Let's show just a little of what Cho spent his time on. Readers who are not interested can skip Dia. 2.


Cho was convinced that O would extend at 1 in Dia. 2 rather than connect at 42, so he devoted his time to analysing the variations after Black 2. Just to give the main points, the continuation to 10 is forced. If next White blocks at 12, Black cuts at 11 and wins the capturing race by one move. Consequently, White has to push through with 11, so things get messy with Black 12 on. White blocks at 17 . . . Black pushes up at 22. Even I could probably somehow read it out up to around this point. However, I have no idea what happens in the capturing race — both sides have defects on the outside.

Cho, of course, probably read out the continuation and concluded that it was rea-


sonable for Black. He's battling it out in a world of goblins and demons. He's awesome.

However, O immediately connected at 42. That put Cho off his stride — it probably made him see red. Because all his analysis had gone to waste. In this respect, O is a brilliant competitor. And White 42 induced Cho to make a mistake.

Black 43 is close to being the losing move. Whatever happens, Black must try to break out by attaching at 1 in Dia. 3. White 2 is a vital point, but Black plays the blunt forcing moves of 3, 5, and 7, then continues up to 11. Black accomplishes his original aim if he splits White into two like this and he may be able to destroy something.



Dia. 3
keep White separated



Dia. 4
simpler

Perhaps White should answer with 2 and 4 in Dia. 4. Black lightly hanes at 5 and takes sente. You can't say that Black gets a better result than White, but still it's far superior to Black's result in the game. Note that if, instead of 2, White wedges in at 'a', Black takes all the side profit with 'b'—White 3 and 'c' through 'g', which is hopeless.

Permitting White 44 is painful.

Cho's erratic form continues: Black 45 is clearly an overplay. Black should play more patiently with Black 47, White 45, Black A, White B, Black C.

Black 47 was the last move played on the first day. Next morning, when I opened the envelope with the sealed move, I panicked.

I was convinced that the sealed move would be White 50, but when I looked at the game record, it wasn't there. During the two or three seconds it took me to find White 48 I was afraid I was going to disgrace myself as referee.


The result to 52 is the pits for Black. Instead of wreaking destruction on White, he has just made a small expansion in territory from an already solid position, on top of which he needs another stone at 63 to complete his position. White has trampled all over him.

Black is so upset he switches to 53, but White has a good answer at 54. Instead of 59, simply capturing at 65 is superior. At this point, Cho's play is a little slovenly.

White 66 is an exquisite move. Black probably has little choice about 67. He would like to atari at 68, but after White D—Black E White will slide at F, which will be unbearable.

After going to all the trouble of attacking in the bottom left corner, Cho sees his stones captured by 68. Even a reverse komi might not be enough now, he said later. That assessment seems on the ball.

White 70 feels a little too severe. It would be simpler to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. This way White would have a good chance of getting centre territory.



Dia. 5: better for White

Figure 4 (72–100). *Cho's uncharacteristic losing move*

We see an interesting shape with 72, 73, and 76. Each move has its own logic, but one can't escape the feeling that the players are trying too hard. For example, White 74 — wouldn't it be simpler to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*? If Black 4, White answers with 5.

White 80 is a mistake. I think O overlooked Black's move at 81. If White intercepts with 82 at 89, Black counters with A—

White B—Black 87 and White can't do anything.

White switches to 82, but the game has become confused.

White 90. There's nothing wrong with extending at C.






Figure 4 (72–100)



Dia. 6: more straightforward



Dia. 7: Black's best chance

Black 91 seems to be Cho's losing move. He should force with 1 in *Dia. 7*. Black keeps sente up to 8, so he can next secure the corner with 9. White will now play 10 and 12. White seems to be ahead, but Black would still be in the game. It's strange to see a player like Cho miss such an opportunity.

White's cut at 96 is severe.





Figure 5 (101-162)

Figure 5 (101-162). A flawless wrap-up

Black removes all aji in the corner with 7, but he is in bad trouble when White attacks in the centre with 8. The forcing moves of 16 and 18 look good, and White 20 next is severe. White is thick everywhere, so the black group could die at any minute.

Black 27. Black has no choice about this and the ensuing moves. White makes a ponnuki at 32 and cuts with 36: preparations for the wrap-up are proceeding apace.



Dia. 8: assured destruction

White 42 is a spectacular deciding blow. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 8, White plays 2 and 4, and Black will surely perish.

The result in the game after Black 43 is similar.

I was worried about O after his one-sided losses in Games One and Two, but this game shows that he's O.K. It's not that I'm cheering for him — but this win makes the Honinbo match more exciting. I want O to rally his forces for a comeback.

Of course, for Cho this may have just been a game in which he indulged his penchant for playing around.

Black resigns after White 162.

(Kido, August 1998.)

Game Four: Cho takes control

White: Cho Chikun

Black: O Rissei

Played in Kita Kyushu City on June 22 & 23, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Report by Fukano Masao.




Figure 1 (1-33)


Figure 1 (1-33). Peeping as an alternative

This was not a very good game for Rissei. He got off to a bad start and the cause seems to have been his fuseki plan.

Black 21 is a turning point. The atari of 21 is a reasonable move, of course, but peeping at 1 in Dia. 1 looks like a good alternative. The sequence to 14 is one continuation. It

was played in a game in the 23rd (1998) Meijin league between Kobayashi Koichi (white) and Kataoka Satoshi. Apparently the players referred to this variation in their review of the game. Cho is reported to have said that he planned to play 10 at 'a' to avoid giving Black a good 'checking extension' (*tsume*)¹ from the top right. There are other variations, too — for example, simply playing Black 11 at 'b'. Anyway, I think that this diagram was well worth considering.

I have my doubts about the extension of Black 33.



Dia. 1: an alternative to 21





Figure 2 (33-43)


¹A move that extends from one's own position and prevents the opponent from extending from his.

Figure 2 (33-43). *The capture is too good.*

Black 33 is certainly big. However, in this position one wants to extend at 1 in *Dia. 2*. In fact, I think that Black has no choice but to do so. If White 2, Black 3 and 5 follow. This hand-to-hand fighting may be frightening for Black, but it's also frightening for White.



*Dia. 2
an unpredictable fight*



*Dia. 3
the only move*

The large-knight move of 35 feels a little thin. Perhaps Black A is best. If then White 38, Black plays Black 40, White 36, Black 37.

The capture of White 38 is really good *aji*. White's position is perfect. Even if hundreds of years pass, Black won't get any foothold for attacking it. That's why I maintain that Black should have used 33 to extend at 38. Did Rissei overlook 38 or did he underestimate its value? Either way, letting White play 38 was unlike him.

Then Black responds with 39. This is so slow it's painful — presumably Rissei became worried about his thinness in the centre, but these two moves don't bear comparison. The capture takes genuine substance, the other move merely reinforces thinness. Rissei is the type of player who doesn't worry so much about the *fuseki*, but falling behind here must have been a big handicap.

Sealing White in with Black 39 at 1 in *Dia. 3* was probably the only move. Settling his group on the side with 2 and 4 is best for White. As before, having permitted White's capture at the top is painful, but in this diagram Black builds thickness, so it's

preferable to the game. All one can say is that there were inconsistencies in Rissei's strategy.

White naturally drives a wedge between Black's forces with 40 and 42. I can't believe Black's answer at 43. The diagonal connection has few merits — Black should connect solidly at B. Of course, it takes more than this to put Rissei out of contention, but it's undeniable that there were errors in his opening strategy.





Figure 3 (43-67)



Dia. 4: must connect solidly

Figure 3 (43-67). A move worthy of Rissei

Instead of 43, Black should simply connect at 1 in Dia. 4. If White 2, Black makes the two-step hane of 3 and 5. With the solid connection, turning at Black 'a' will be sente,

which is a significant difference. If Black 'a' is sente, then White's side group is affected.

The flow of the game is good for White. However, at this point Rissei plays a strong move. The peep of 51 is the kind of move we expect from him. Attaching at 53 makes the game really difficult. In this kind of position, an ordinary professional would probably fall victim to the 'O magic'.

White 58 is incredible. The conventional strategy would be to push up at 60; Black will play A, so White then challenges him to a fight with White 67 or B. However, Cho's analysis has already incorporated the variation in which White sacrifices the centre and the variation in which he swings into action at the bottom left.

The cut of 62 was another tremendous move. When Black captured at 67, I thought he was doing well, but . . .





Figure 4 (67-100)

Figure 4 (67-100). Cho is full of confidence.

Black 67 was the sealed move. The only move, you could say. It made Black thick and gave him a good game — or so I thought, but when I saw 68 to 76 I was shocked. If White can do this, you can't say that Black had a good game. And if permitting 68 is bad for Black, that means that he had to play 67 at 1 in Dia. 5. However, White 2 creates complications. If Black answers 4 with 'a', White plays 'b'. The game would probably be bad for Black if he lost these two key stones. In short, Cho read out all this

when he cut at 62 in Figure 3.

White 88 and 90 are also impressive. Cho's judgement is that the game is not bad for him if he gets the corner. The uncharacteristic placidity of his play from 92 to 100 is a sign of his confidence that White has the lead.



Dia. 5: necessary, but complications follow





Figure 5 (101-116)

Figure 5 (101-116). Black should be more aggressive.

I heard that Rissei pushed up at 1 immediately, but I think that he should have given this move more thought.

Couldn't Black have played more aggressively with 1 in *Dia. 6*? White 2 is a worry, but Black should be able to capture

the centre stones with 3. Of course, I'm not saying that 1 gives Black the lead, just that it's better than what happens in the game.



Dia. 6: trying to make a game of it

Black 5. As Rissei said himself after the game, Black A or B might have been better. Cho did say that that would have spelt trouble for White, but this kind of comment in the game review can't be taken at face value. White will just slide to C and, as before, Black has a tough game.

Having played 1 and 5 [filling in white liberties], Black would like to attack at D, but White simply answers at E, so Black D is nothing special.

Figure 6 (116-166) (next page). Ahead on the board

By this time, Rissei must have been aware that he was behind. In the end, White went ahead on the board, but the game could have been a lot closer.

For example, the forcing move of 17 seems dubious. Black should simply connect at 1 in *Dia. 7*. If White 2, Black can then attach at 'a' or he could descend at 3. Because of the aji remaining in the corner, Black might be able to link up or live.

The 17-18 exchange sets up 24 and 26 for White. When he links up here, his lead becomes irrevocable.

In this game, Rissei didn't show his characteristic tenacity. Already he is faced with a *kadoban*, but we all know better than to count him out yet.





Figure 6 (116–166)



Dia. 7: keeping the aji open

Black resigns after White 166.
(Kido, August 1998)

Game Five O survives the kadoban

White: O Rissei

Black: Cho Chikun

Played in Tomakomai City, Hokkaido, on
June 29 & 30, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.

Figure 1 (1–22). An adventurous start by both
sides

The game begins with adventurous play

by Rissei: the 5–3 point of 4 and the high approach move of 6. He then ignores Black 7 and switches to 8. His play is free-spirited and daring. This is the real Rissei style.





Figure 1 (1–22)




Dia. 1: giving Black the initiative

However, there is no way you can say the result to 12 looks good for White. Black has no cause for dissatisfaction. If you change the order of moves, the result is equivalent to Dia. 1. After 1, White plays the joseki from 2; when Black enters the corner at 7, White plays the shoulder hit at 8, permitting Black to pincer at 9. In effect, White has let Black play first in three corners.


Instead of 13, Black could also consider A or B. Of course, 13 is not bad either.

Rissei is quite aware of the above considerations. His choice of fuseki strategy is deliberate — he doesn't believe the outcome of the game will be decided by these factors.

Rissei's adventurous play prompts Cho to indulge himself too, as shown by Black 19. Black has made the narrow extension to 17, so C is not an urgent point for either side [Black doesn't need to reinforce 15–17; conversely, White can't hope to attack it]. If Black is not afraid of White, then Black 19 is not urgent.



Dia. 2: Black develops rapidly



Dia. 3: another possibility

Ten professionals out of ten would play 19 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black 3 could also be at 'a', but, putting this aside, the development here is the commonsense one; what's more, it's speedy. If White 4, Black can answer at 5

with no fears (if White 'b', Black 'c').

Black 19 aims at the invasion of D (25 in Figure 2) and the diagonal move of E (31), moves that Cho tries to make the keynote of this game. However, White 20 and 22 regain the speed that White had surrendered to Black. With *Dia. 2*, Black would have kept the edge in speed.

Black 21 is an excellent move, but extending to 1 in *Dia. 3* is also feasible. Even if White plays 2 to 6, the influence of his thickness is limited by the marked black stone. If White 2 at 3, Black 2 and White 'a' follow, after which Black invades at 'b', giving a completely different game.



O Rissei is the leader of the large contingent of Taiwanese-born players active at the Nihon Ki-in (14 at present). This is the third Honinbo title match contested by two players born outside Japan, but the concept of nationality has been replaced by affiliation: foreign-born members of the Nihon Ki-in often represent Japan in international tournaments and Japanese go fans don't seem to mind the success of foreign players in Japan. Rin Kaiho (born in Shanghai), for example, has enjoyed great popularity for decades.





Figure 2 (23-39)



Dia. 4: safe but not what Black wants

Figure 2 (23-39). Was there no alternative?

Black builds momentum with the invasion of 25, the slide of 29, and the diagonal move of 31: Cho's plan with the marked stone has now been revealed. Neither side can draw back in this fight. Even while caught up in it, though, both sides have their sights on the top side (an invasion for Black, a defensive move for White) and the bottom black moyo. Since whole-board problems are involved, settling for a safe result locally is not good enough.


For example, using 27 to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 would be safe. However, White's profit with 2 to 8 is not to be sneezed at; worst of all, there is nothing left for Black to

aim at. This is not the result Black was thinking of when he played the marked stone in the figure.


Even so, it seems to me that the sequence in the game is painful for Black if he is compelled to peep at 39. If instead Black plays A, White secures definite life with B, which is not interesting for Black. Whatever happens, Black wants to threaten White's eye shape by playing at B himself. However, Black's own position is not secure enough for him to play B immediately. He therefore plays 39 to prepare the way for B, but White can't be expected to answer submissively at C. He's ready with a counterattack.

The result is not favourable, so playing 39 is painful. But if you ask if 39 is dubious, the answer is no. The problem lies earlier, in my opinion.

Putting aside Cho's fuseki concept, the immediate invasion of 25 may be questionable. Mightn't it be a better strategy to play 25 immediately at 31, that is, at 1 in Dia. 5, to see how White responds? If White defends the corner with 2, Black then invades at 3. If the same moves (26 to 28) follow as in the game, Black is left with the option of linking up with 'a'. Even if Black were to play b'-White 'c'-Black 'd', the 1-2 exchange proves its effectiveness in preventing White from following Dia. 4.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If White responds to Black 1 by defending the top corner with 2, Black plays 3. If Black is allowed to play at 'a' next, this

is a dead shape.

Dia. 7. If White plays 1, he can live, but Black gouges out his corner up to 9, on top of which White is not alive *yet*. The successive moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* are very severe.



It's certainly true that in the game Black gets stones at both 31 and 37. But the surrounding position is completely different from the diagrams. White has stones at 30 and 32, and has also played on top of Black at 36. These differences are why White goes all out with 38.

If out of concern for his own safety White plays 38 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black attaches underneath at 2. Black will be satisfied if he captures the marked white stone with the moves to 6. Black can now launch a counter-attack with 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c'.

Considering White has played aggressively with 38, Black wants to make his move at B as telling as possible. That's why Cho made the decision to peep at 39, but . . .

Figure 3 (40–49). Losing points in advance

White 40 is a natural counterattack. Cho did not overlook it, of course; from the outset, presumably, his plan was to dispose of the two black stones on the side and switch to 47. Even so, capturing those stones is big, so that puts a lot of pressure on Black to take compensatory profit by harassing the corner white group.

It's hardly necessary to say that using 40

to connect at 41 would be submissive. Black will storm around the board with A–White B–Black C, after which the eye-stealing move of Black 47 might really become a decisive blow. Likewise, if Black uses 41 to connect at 46, White 43 will force Black D, so Black will fall a move behind at an important stage of the game.





Figure 3 (40–49)



Dia. 9: safe but not sure

Instead of 45, Black could go for safety-first with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9*, but, as I've been saying repeatedly, safety-first is not good enough. If White lived with 4, Black would not feel like playing on. Yet if Black played 3 at 4, White 3 would turn the tables. That means that the moves to 46 are inevitable.

Black 47 was the sealed move. You can call it the only move. White 48 in response is

quite an impressive move. It directly threatens to link up with White 49. Black plays 49 to prevent that, but that leaves White with unequivocal sente moves at E and F. These sente moves are White's lifeline. If he makes proper use of them, White will have no trouble rescuing his group.




Figure 4 (50-67)

Figure 4 (50-67). Rissei's second thoughts

The bottom-left white group doesn't have two eyes. However, the black group above it is also weak, so Black can't resort to strong-arm measures.


For example, if Black answers White 50 with Black 52-White A-Black B, White plays in at C and a capturing race is unavoidable. There's no way Black can win this capturing race.

Black therefore attaches at 51. Let's imagine that White answers this at 55: Black pulls back at D and White loses the sente move of C, on top of which Black gets a cutting point at 65 and the hane of E. In other words, White can't afford to answer 51 directly.

You can say that backtracking with the reinforcement of White 52 is natural. The only thing is that the way White backtracks is dubious — Rissei is supposed to have commented later that 'White 52 was heavy'. As becomes clear in the continuation, White in the end has to discard his handful of centre stones. In which case, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10* would have been lighter. This would

have kept the damage to a minimum, according to Rissei. I find myself in complete agreement.

White hauls out his centre stones with 56, but Black's attack with 57 is severe. Black's moves start to work perfectly — witness 61. White's moves from 64 on even begin to have an air of desperation. The sequence Rissei showed in *Dia. 10* would have given White an easy game, what with his large profit on the left side.



Dia. 10: taking the pressure off White




Figure 5 (68-76)

Figure 5 (68-76). Good judgement by White


Rissei is a very skilful fighter. He's particularly clever at picking the right time to withdraw from a fight. It's often said that it's hard to know when one should back off, but

Rissei is a master at this. Most people keep on fighting through the sheer weight of their own momentum, but when he has decided that further fighting is not a wise policy, Rissei withdraws instantly, even if a change of direction is involved.

White 76 in response to Black 75 is a good example.

The bottom-left white group has poked its head out with 72 and 74. It would be only human to want to keep on fleeing with White A once one has played the marked stone. But if one does so, Black will most likely get to invade the top with B. Moreover, running out with White A may quite possibly expose the white group at the bottom to danger once again. Abandoning the centre stones is distressing, but it seems to show good judgement — though I'm not saying that it puts White ahead.

Incidentally, White can get an eye in sente for his bottom left group if he plays at 1 in *Dia. 11*. However, provoking Black 2 sets up Black 'a', causing White a terrible loss, so White will be most reluctant to play 1. That means that all White can count on here is one eye in gote with White 'b'. Although he has poked his head out, White has to keep a careful eye on this group.



Dia. 11: an expensive eye

Figure 6 (77–88). *Putting more pressure on White*

I wonder if Rissei felt confident in his position when he played the marked stone. Did Cho believe that he was ahead when he captured with 81? These are questions only the players can answer.

Most players would say that the game can't be bad for Black after 81. But that's not the case. Black's initial loss on the left side

was so large that the game is now a good contest.





Figure 6 (77–88)



Dia. 12: putting more pressure on White

White 82 defends against Black A. Black 83 is big: compare White 83. If Black omits 87, White harasses him with B. After rushing here and there around the board, White gets to occupy the last large point of 88. It now seems that the position is very tough for Black.

Working backwards, one has to question Black 81. Shouldn't Black have followed up from 77 and 79 by playing at 1 in *Dia. 12*? Finding the best answer to 1 is difficult. If White 'a', Black may link under with Black 6. If instead White 2, Black plays 3 to 9, capturing the centre white stones more efficiently. Moreover, the white group is still not settled. I think that this variation would have made the game more difficult for White.





Figure 7 (89-112)



Dia. 13: no problem

Figure 7 (89-112). A miscalculation by Cho?

The way the centre white stones have been captured is pitiful, but purely as territory it's nothing special. The neighbouring white position is solid, so White doesn't have to worry too much about territory accruing to Black's thickness. That being so, White's territory from the top to the left will have a big impact.

If there is anything that Black can do at the top, then 89 is the time to do it. However, I can't find any kind of decisive move.

For example, White 1 in *Dia. 13*: if this move works, it will be decisive. But if White calmly extends at 2, Black 3 and 5 don't look like leading anywhere. If Black plays 5 at 6, White answers at 5; if then Black 'a', White 'b' to 'f' follow.

Actually, it feels unnatural to be trying to pull something off at the top at this stage. Cho probably had no such intention. In that case, we arrive at the conclusion that the marked stone, securing the capture of the

centre white group, was dubious.

Cho being Cho, I don't believe that he was being over-optimistic. He was probably full of confidence in his move. Perhaps he made a miscalculation about the subsequent endgame. After White 94 to 98, the game is going to be decided by the komi.




Figure 8 (113-172)

Figure 8 (113-172). At his best with white?

Rissei has won twice with white, the third and fifth games. He seems to do better with white than with black. When you take black, you are burdened with the mission of creating the game. When you have white, you just have to follow Black's lead.

When Rissei has black, he tries too hard to shape the game himself; sometimes he goes too much for territory, making himself thin. With white, he stakes out solid positions and plays good games.

Black seals White in with 15 and 19, but blocking at 16 is also big, so White doesn't lose points. The reducing move of 20 also serves to expand White's right side. When he played here, Rissei was probably confident of victory.

Black 59 and 71 just set the scene for resignation: Black knows he's behind. Black 59 at A and Black 71 at B would be safer, but either way Black doesn't have enough territory. If Black answers White 72 at C, White can attach at D.

Black resigns after White 172.

(Kido, August 1998)

Game Six: Setting a new record

White: Cho Chikun

Black: O Rissei

Played in Fukuoka Hot Spring, Ibaraki Prefecture, on July 13 & 14, 1998.

Commentary by Cho Chikun.

Report by Kobori Keiji.





Figure 1 (1-26)



Dia. 1: the right move

Figure 1 (1-26). The inspiration of a moment

I didn't plan to do this, but the game started out as mimic go. There are various points at which White can quit mimicking.


First of all, White 6 — playing the high Chinese style of A would lead to a completely different game.

I thought that Black might play 15 at B. I

would follow suit with C, again leading to a different game. I got the impression from O Rissei later that he might have preferred that.

The problem arises after Black plays 15. I decided to swallow my pride and continue mimicking for a little while longer, but I now have regrets.


Dia. 1. Going by the essential nature of go, I should have answered at 1. You can't call this exchange a forcing one (*kikashi*) for Black. However, if Black jumps to 2 and White answers at 'a', then 2 becomes a forcing move. Instead, White would naturally have to plunge into the black moyo, but choosing the right invasion point is very difficult. I deferred the problem by playing 16. Psychologically, that's a 'retreat': it shows that I was more concerned with winning and setting a new record than with playing the best go.



Dia. 2: better for Black?

On seeing 19, I decided it was time to stop mimicking, so I invaded at 20. If I continue to ape Black with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black plays 2 or 'a', and to my eyes Black seems to be leading.

O responded to the invasion by entering at the 3-3 point with 21. To me, this move showed that O was playing well and was full of confidence. Usually, you'd expect Black to play at 1 or 'a' in *Dia. 3* (next page). However, White will defiantly take up position inside the moyo with 2 and 4, which may make Black nervous. The marked white stone is inviting this kind of attack.



Dia. 3: White invites the attack

The moves 24 and 26 occurred to me the instant Black invaded at the 3-3. It's tempting to play like this, keeping in reserve one's answer to 23. It's simply one possible line.




Figure 2 (24-47)


Figure 2 (24-47). A favourable development for White

I thought for quite a while before I played 24 and 26, as I had various worries about the follow-up. If White plays 26 first, Black plays A, then ignores White 24 in favour of Black 29, and White's atari at B achieves nothing.


When Black plays 27, White is left with the move dancing out at C, so I think White has scored a success here. However, it is

now easier for Black to convert the bottom right into territory, so he has made a gain too. It's hard to make a sweeping conclusion about the result.

Dia. 4. The conclusion in the review after the game was that Black 1 would, after all, have been better. The diagonal connection of 5 is stylish — if instead Black connects at 7, White gets the better result. Choosing between White 14 and 'a' is perplexing; when Black launches a preemptive attack at 15, White will no longer have the leisure to aim at the peep at 'b'. The two sides are closely matched, so this variation gives a reasonable game. This seems to have been the first turning point of the game. I was worried that Black would tenuki with 29 and attack White at D.



through 'd' instead of 2 would be unreasonable.




Dia. 5
better for Black

Dia. 6
good for White

I immediately struck at the *hazama* of White 44. Black then sealed his next move, finishing the first day. If Black had played 45 at 46, followed by White 45, the game would have been completely different. Black 47 was an impressive move — if instead Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, White gets a lot of territory. Alternatively —

Dia. 7. If Black attaches at 1, White cuts at 2. If Black and White then move towards the top with 3 and 4, Black is left with a defect at 'a'; would Black be able to play the proper move (*honte*) of 3 at 'a'? The variation Black 1 at 'b'—White 2—Black 'c' also looks favourable for White.



Dia. 7: a favourable fight for White

Figure 3 (48–58). Compromising

When I pushed down at 48, after over two hours of thought, I had read out the local variations and visualized various continuations. I spend most of my thinking time comparing different variations, not reading deeply.

If Black plays 53 at 1 in Dia. 8, White cuts with 2 and 4 and wins the capturing race — both Rissei and I read out this line.

Discovering the moves of 54 and 56 was one fruit of the time I had spent on analysis. During the review of the game, someone suggested playing 56 at 1 in Dia. 9, but I can't agree. White may capture the corner, but Black is thick on the outside.

Black 57. If Black A—White B—Black 57, White then captures at C and there's no aji or anything left for Black in the centre.






Figure 3 (48–58)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9
6: connects

White 58. Rescuing three stones with A would be big, but the main focus of this game is on how much of the area from the top to the centre is secured by White. I spent another long period thinking and played 58. Part of my time was spent comparing 58 with D. White 58 is definitely not a bad move; to the casual glance it appears well-

balanced, but it is a compromise, played from the desire to win. There was a severer, more thoroughgoing variation that I rejected. If I had chosen this variation and won, the game would probably have been recognized as a masterpiece for me.





Figure 4 (58-71)



Dia. 10: the right way to play


Figure 4 (58-71). Behind the compromise

Dia. 10 shows the proper way to play instead of 58. White attaches at 1, then presses at 3. Black can hardly crawl along the third line, so he will cut with 4 and 6, but White pushes up with 7 to 11, then surrounds the centre with 13. With this kind of thickness to back him up, White will be able to annihilate any invader. If Black competes in surround-

ing territory, without invading, White will win. If Black plays 10 at 'a', a similar result follows with White 10, Black 'b', White 12, Black 'c', White 'd'. If Black plays 2 at 'e', White 3 may no longer be effective, so White will play 13 as in the game. The White 1-Black 'e' exchange would be a *kikashi* (forcing move) for White.

In this way, I passed over the all-out variation — because of my fear that if Black plunged into my moyo and lived, I would lose immediately. It is a major regret.

The invasion of 59 and 61 can be put off no longer. Capturing with Black 1 to 5 in Dia. 11 is big, but White would get secure territory of 120 points. This would immediately give White the game.



Dia. 11: giving White the game

Figure 5 (72-90). Glaring at the centre

The question is how skilfully Black looks after his stones inside the white moyo. At this point I had no confidence. After 72 to 76, the three white stones below are automatically saved, which is big. However, the centre black group is gradually making shape.

After Black 83, the group doesn't have two eyes if White plays at A, but the exit to the right is still open. Looking at it from Black's side, Black A would make solid eye shape and Black would be left with the big connection at B.

White 88 and 90 are, of course, aiming at the centre group. Blocking at White C will be severe, so Black must answer. If Black played 89 at 1 in Dia. 12, White 2 might not

be sente; in fact, after 4, White would have to worry about Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c'. Therefore, instead of 2, White would probably go for territory with White 'd' through 'h'.





Figure 5 (72-90)



Dia. 12: a different game

Figure 6 (91-109). My field of vision opens up.

Black must make an answer, but he can hardly crawl, so pushing up and cutting is natural. If Black extends at 98 after White 96, White will exchange White 109 for Black A, then kill the centre black group with White 97. That means that Black 97 is forced, but when White ataris at 98 and 100, he can suddenly see his way clearly. I recall that at this point I felt that I had a definite lead.

White is aiming at pulling off something with White B, so he doesn't want to play 100 at 101.

Rissei expressed regrets about 101. He said he should have switched to 1 and 3 in Dia. 13. Black next ignores 6, switching to 7. White then goes into action with 8, getting a ko. This might have made the game more difficult.

The last fight starts when Black cuts at 109.





Figure 6 (91-109)



Dia. 13: Rissei's regrets



趙治勲




Figure 7 (110-131)

Figure 7 (110-131). Confident of victory

The last fight was full of incident. When I played 10 and 12, I had a premonition — or rather a feeling — that this would be good enough. You can actually see quite a long way ahead in the one minute of byo-yomi.

When I answered Black 19 with 20 and 22 I was confident of victory. Perhaps because of the pressure I'd been under going in for the record, I was trembling physically and mentally.

In this position, things are set up just right for White. If Black plays 25 at 26, he loses two stones after White 25, Black 28, White A, Black B, White 27. It was lucky I hadn't exchanged White C for Black D.

The result to 31 is a trade. If the game concludes like this, White wins, but a counterattack by Black leads to another surprising variation.

Figure 8 (132-154). Should have been a close game on the board

Because I played White 32 instead of White 33, Black countered with 33. Actually he was setting the scene for resignation. The variation to 37 was natural momentum. However, this way White got a lead of ten points on the board, so it was all over.

Dia. 14. What if Black makes the usual answer of Black 1? White can press at 2. If Black captures with 7 and 9, White pokes his

head out with 10 and 14 and wins by a big margin. Note that the forcing move of 12 is necessary. This result is painful for Black, so instead of 9 —





Figure 8 (132-154)


*Dia. 14: a big loss for Black*

Dia. 15. Blocking White's path into Black's area with 9 is correct. Black 'a' and 'b' are both sente; after 18, 'c' and 'd' are miai. With this variation, the game would have been a close contest on the board.

Everything worked out conveniently for White in the endgame.

Black resigns after White 154.

(Kido, September 1998. Honinbo report translated by John Power.)



Dia. 15: close on the board



The moment of victory



Besieged by reporters in the victory interview

Michael Redmond beats Cho Chikun

In spring of 1998 Michael Redmond played what must be two of the most memorable games of his career. Within the space of three days he defeated two former world champions: Cho Chikun in the Oza tournament on 9 April and Seo Bong-soo in the Fujitsu Cup on 11 April. The latter was an upset win by one point and was actually Michael's second win against Seo (the first was given in GW71). The game against Cho was no upset: Michael held the initiative throughout. Below we would like to present a brief commentary on this game.

White: Michael Redmond 8-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Meijin & Honinbo

Komi: 5½; time: five hours each

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 9 April 1998.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Early success for White

Going all out with 26 is a good move. White 27 next would be a good checking extension, so Black 27 can't be omitted.

Black's solid extension to 29 in answer to White 28 is dubious. It would be simpler to play Black 31, White 32, Black 30; if next White connected at 35, Black would now extend solidly at 29. With 30 etc., White creates useful aji here, so he has done well.






Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (51-100). White's tesuji leads to moyo success.

Black 57. Jumping into the centre with 1 in Dia. 1 is better. If White 2, Black gets good aji with 3.

Wedging in at White 60 is a superb move.

Black 61. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White counters with 2 to 6, taking large profit in the corner.

Black therefore has no choice about 61, but White builds a large moyo in the center with 64 to 78. This result is a success for White.

White 90, setting up forcing moves to prepare the way for 94 and 96, is an exquisite move.




Figure 3 (101-164)
7: captures (marked stone); 19: ko (at 9)

Figure 3 (101-164). Annihilating the invader

Playing a ko with 3 is the natural flow. A large trade follows when White ends the ko with 6. As before, White has the lead.

Black's last hopes rest on his invasion on the centre right, but there doesn't seem to be any way to live.

In this game, Michael Redmond challenged triple-crown holder Cho to a fight and scored a splendid victory.

(Igo, September 1998. Translated by John Power.)

Chinese Tournaments

The 1st Chinese Kisei Title 9-dan Tournament

White: Zhang Wendong 9-dan

Black: Chen Zude 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points

Played on October 19, 1998 in Beijing.

Commentary by Chen Zude.





Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50)

White 16 was a good move. If White ataris with 1 in *Dia. 1* and sacrifices three stones with the sequence to 11, Black gets sente and makes an enclosure in the upper left with 12.



Dia. 1

White 42 is necessary. It lets Black link up, but resisting stubbornly with White 1 in *Dia. 2* is bad. After Black jumps to 4, White is left with two weak groups.



Dia. 2

Instead of White 48, it is also possible for White to play the sequence White A-Black 50-White B.

Figure 2 (51-100)

Instead of the two-space extension to Black 57, a one-space extension to 97 would have been safer.

Black should have omitted 65 and simply hane at 67. Because of the 65-66 exchange, White was able to jump to 68. He can next aim to hane out at A.

Black invades on the second line with 69. He now has more territory than White.

White 88 was a good move, but Zhang regretted playing 90. He should have run away at 91 instead. If Black persists with the sequence Black B–White C–Black D–White E–Black F–White G–Black H, Black's shape below is destroyed after White plays I.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 3 (101–150)

Extending to Black 1 was big. Black was now well ahead in territory.




Figure 3 (101–150)

However, the hane of Black 19 was reckless. It was more urgent to jump to 35. Had Black played this move, he would have been able to live in the lower left corner without any trouble after 39. As it was, he had to struggle to get two eyes.

White stakes out a claim to the territory in the

bottom left with 26. This is a big move.

The game now hinges on the outcome of Black's invasion at 27.

White 50 was the losing move. White should have hane at A instead. If Black B–White C–Black D–White E–Black F–White G–Black H, Black's shape below is destroyed after White plays I.




Figure 4 (151–200)

72, 78, 86: at 64; 75, 83: 69

Figure 4 (151–200)

When Black plays 59, White has no chance of catching up.




Figure 5 (201–269)

57: connects at the marked stone

Figure 5 (201–269)

White resigns after Black 269.

(Translated from *Igo* February, 1999.)

1998 Chinese Weiqi Championship

Qiu Jun won the men's division of the 1998 Chinese Weiqi Championship last September 28 by defeating Yu Bin 9-dan. Qiu, who is only 16 years old, has been hailed as a great prodigy. He is the youngest player ever to take a major title in China. We present his game in this championship against another young star, 22-year-old Zhou Heyang.

White: Zhou Heyang 7-dan

Black: Qiu Jun 4-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points

Played on September 23, 1998.





Figure 1 (1-26)

Figure 1 (1-26)

The hane of Black 11 was a strong response to White 10. Up to 25, Black's thick position on the right works perfectly with his two stones on the left. In answer to the marked stone in *Dia. 1*, Yu Bin said that simply jumping to 1 is best. If Black 2, White could exchange 3 for Black 4, then jump to 5. If Black 4 at 'a', White 'b' is a good response.



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (27-100)

Black plays 29 with the aim of extending to A, so pinching the black stone at 27 with 30 is natural.

White 32 tempts Black to jump to 80, but this would let White reinforce his position on the left side. Therefore, Black attaches at 33. This move shows Qiu's youthful confidence and fighting spirit.





Figure 2 (27-100)

If White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* in answer to the marked stone, he can settle his stones at the top with the sequence to 7.



Dia. 2

The attachment of Black 35 is a sharp move. The sequence to 41 is like 'riding on the back of a tiger.' Black has broken into White's corner, while White has settled his stones at the top. However, Black has come out better in this exchange.

Descending to Black 45 is a shrewd move, enabling Black to squeeze with 47 and 49, taking the corner territory. This is big. White 48 at 49 would be unreasonable.

Black 89 is probably the best point to invade White's territorial framework.

It might have been better for White to have patiently played at 93 in response to Black 89.

Qiu isn't afraid of the threats inherent in White 90 and he jumps deep into White's moyo with 93. This is the winning move.




Figure 3 (101-150)




Figure 4 (151-209)

Figure 3 (101-150), Figure 4 (151-209)
White resigns after Black 209.

This was a brilliant game for Qiu, and it showed how fresh and sharp his go is. To everyone's surprise, he went on to win the next three games and become the youngest Chinese champion ever at the age of 16. We will undoubtedly be hearing more from this young prodigy in the future.

(Translated from *Igo*, January 1999.)

The 4th NEC Cup

White: Chang Hao 8-dan
Black: Shao Weigang 9-dan
Komi: 5 1/2 points.
Played on August 22, 1998.

Two years ago, Shao Weigang won the NEC Cup and Chang Hao won it last year, so this was a hotly contested game between two champions. It ended in a half-point victory for Chang Hao.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Black 21 was dubious. Black should have played at 22 instead. This was the vital point for both sides.

Black 23 was a crude move. Shao should have simply jumped to 25 instead.

White should have jumped out to A with 42. If Black B, White could jump to C and the two black stones on the right side would come under attack.




Figure 2 (51-100)

73, 91: at 65; 88: at 70

Figure 2 (51-100)

White 56 was the most problematic move of

this game. White should have played the knight's move at 69. If Black A, then White B. Black is now unable to unite his positions above and below as he does with 61 and 63.

However, Black 73 was careless. If Black had jumped to C, he would have built a moyo on a grand scale.

The invasion of White 76 was the game-deciding move. When White turns at 86, Black's moyo has been wiped out. The lead has returned to White.




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 3 (101-150)

Black must play 7 at 17, forcing White to connect at A. He could then play at 7. Now if White ataris at 8, Black can atari at B and sacrifice two stones. Because his group in the corner is not quite alive, Black had to connect at 9. This was passive, but, unfortunately, necessary.




Figure 4 (151-200)




Figure 5 (201-250)




Figure 6 (251-291)

55: at ; 57: at 52; 81, 87, 92: at ;
84, 90: at 78

Figure 4 (151-200), Figure 5 (201-250),
Figure 6 (251-291)

White wins by half a point.

(Translated from *Igo*, December 1998)

As the holder of the Chinese NEC Cup, Chang Hao played the Japanese NEC Cup holder, Yoda Norimoto on October 18 and 19 in a best-of-three playoff. Yoda, who always does well against Chinese and Korean players, won two straight games.

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Michael Redmond on the Opening

In the last installment, I analyzed the low Chinese opening (Black A in *Figure 1*). In this issue I will analyze the case where Black makes a corner enclosure with 5 instead of playing A or B (the high Chinese opening) in *Figure 1*. The basis for this installment's opening is my TV analysis of the fifth game of the 23rd Meijin title match between Cho Chikun (White) and O Rissei.






Figure 1 (1-6)

The right-side 3-4 point of Black 3 in *Dia. 1* is often played. If White occupies the two corner star points (*niren-sei*) on the left with 2 and 4, Black will approach with 5 and extend to 7 instead of making a corner enclosure at A. This is currently a popular pattern and is known as the mini-Chinese opening.




Dia. 1

If White plays on the 3-4 point with 2 in *Dia. 2*, Black will make a corner enclosure with 3. White will probably break up Black's formation on the right with 4, giving Black the chance to make an approach move, such as the two-space approach of 5, which has come into vogue recently. Depending on White's response to 5, Black will look for a chance to play another approach move against the white stone in the upper left at A.




Dia. 2

After Black makes a corner enclosure, Black would like to play the two marked stones in *Dia. 3*. If he could do this, he would have made an ideal formation at the bottom.




Dia. 3

Therefore, White will want to extend to somewhere around 1 in *Dia. 4* to neutralize the influence of Black's corner enclosure.




Dia. 4

In answer to White 1, Black would probably make an approach move at 2 in *Dia. 5* and White would pincer at 3. The joseki to White 9 could be expected. After White 7, there are a lot of variations, but Black 8 is the most representative move. With his stone at 1 on the fourth line, White has a well-balanced position, so he is satisfied.




Dia. 5

If the marked stone were on the third line in *Dia. 6*, this would not be a good result for White. Black could cap at A, so White would be unable to use his influence on the left to build a moyo.




Dia. 6

In the game, White extended all the way to 1 in *Dia. 7*. In this case as well, White must not pincer with 3 when Black approaches with 2. After White 9, the shoulder hit of Black 10 will prevent White from developing into the center. Instead of 10, Black could also cap at A.




Dia. 7

When White has made a long extension to 1 in *Dia. 8*, the checking extension to Black 2 is too narrow.




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Black might consider making an approach move inside White's sphere of influence with 1 in *Dia. 9*. White will attach with 2 before defending with 4, and Black must be content with a narrow extension to 5. He is not completely satisfied, since his stones are a bit overconcentrated. With the two stones at 1 and 3, the ideal extension would be to A. However, the extension with White 6 from the marked stone is perfect, so this result favors White.



Dia. 10


Attaching with 2 in *Dia. 9* is the key move. If White simply defends with 2 in *Dia. 10*, Black will slide to 3, then extend to 5. The result after White 6 is better for Black than the one in *Dia. 9*.



Dia. 11


If White had extended one line to the left with his marked stone, Black could play the sequence from 1 to White 4 in *Dia. 11*, then play the checking extension of 5. Black 5 is the perfect distance from his corner enclosure. Black could also play 5 without 1 and 3.

In reponse to the marked stone in *Dia. 12*. White might also extend to 1. In this case, Black will probably make a double-approach at 2. One possible continuation is the sequence to Black 20. Black's opening is fast-paced, but White is thick, so the result is playable for both sides. Later, White will attack the corner with A.




Dia. 12

Now let's look at the approach move from the left side at Black 1 in *Dia. 13*. If White answers on the fourth line with 2, Black can play 3 later and the invasion at A is severe. A direct invasion at A is also possible.



Dia. 13


Black could immediately play the sequence from 1 to 5 in *Dia. 14*. Next, he can aim to invade White's thin position at the bottom at A.



Dia. 14


If White intends to ignore 1 in *Dia. 15*, it is more usual to play the marked stone at A. If Black

were to play B, White's position at the bottom would be wide open, so he would have little prospect of making territory there.




Dia. 15

Another response to Black 1 is the small knight's move of White 2 in *Dia. 16*. White's corner is stronger, so an invasion at Black A is not so severe. White can safely extend to B.




Dia. 16

When White has played the marked stone, the invasion of Black 1 in *Dia. 17* is severe. White can settle his stone on the right by extending to 2, but Black can gouge out the base of White's stones on the left by sliding to A.



Dia. 17

The marked stone on the third line in *Dia. 18* is a tight move. Therefore, White will not feel compelled to answer 1 at A. He could play elsewhere or play B or C, either immediately or later.



Dia. 18

After White made the long extension to 6 in *Figure 2*, Black jumped in between the two star-

point stones on the left side with 7 and White made an approach move with 8.






Figure 2 (6-8)

The position on the left was not urgent, so Cho ignored Black 1 in *Dia. 19* and played an approach on the right with 2. The points A and B are miai. That is, if White makes a checking extension around A, Black will extend two space above 1; if White B, Black will extend two spaces below 1.




Dia. 19

Thus, Black will answer White 2 in *Dia. 20* with 3. White defends the corner with 4 and Black makes another approach move with 5 at the top. White secures the corner with 6 and Black extends to 7. White's corner is secure, but Black has managed to establish positions on the left and at the top. Since Black A threatens White's corner, Black's stones on the left are secure. Moreover, White's position is thin — Black can invade at B, C, or D — so this is a difficult game for White.




Dia. 20

Perhaps White 1 from above in *Dia. 21* is better. If Black 2, White defends the corner with 3; if Black 4, White secures the corner with 5. Black is left with the cramped extension to A, while White can make an ideal extension to B.




Dia. 21

Since this is less than satisfactory for Black, he might extend all the way to 1 in *Dia. 22*. If White invades at 2, Black will probably capture this stone with the sequence to 5. If White 6, Black must prevent a link-up by playing 7. If the marked stone were at A, this would be an ideal result for White, but, as it is, he must worry about a black invasion at A. Later, White hopes to be able to use the aji of White B-Black C-White D.




Dia. 22

White could play more simply with White 1 in Dia. 23, but Black is satisfied with his thick shape after 4.



Dia. 23


It is probably best for White to make a tighter extension to 1 in Dia. 24. When Black extends to 2, White responds with the small knight's move of 3. White then reinforces his two stones in the top right with the sequence from 5 to 9. After Black 10, White A is huge and Black will have a harder time invading White's formation in the bottom left.




Dia. 24

What about White 8 in Figure 2, played inside Black's sphere of influence? The normal way would be to make an approach move at the top with 1 in Dia. 25 and play the sequence to 5. Now White

A would become a big move, so Black must preempt it by extending to 6 first. However, with the thick black positions at the top and bottom, White would be loathe to invade there. What's more, if White does invade, a black invasion in the bottom left will be severe. Therefore, Black would probably be able to make a moyo on the right by playing at B. This is the reason that Cho chose to make his approach move with 8 in Figure 2.




Dia. 25




Dia. 26

The move that White must consider carefully when he makes this approach move is Black 2 in Dia. 26. If White invades the corner with 3, the joseki to White 10 will be played. Black ends in sente and has made a moyo on the right side.

Compared to Dia. 26, White 3 in Dia. 27 would be a good move against the pincer of Black 2. The white stone at 1 can now be treated as a forcing move and its aji could be annoying to Black.




Dia. 27



Dia. 28

Therefore, Black will answer with the knight's move of 2 in *Dia. 28*. White will not want to slide to 3 because Black might attach at A. This is why Cho extended to B. Black A has become a popular move recently, and it is very effective in a position such as this, when Black is strong in the lower right.

Dia. 29 shows the kind of result White might get in this position. Black gets a big corner territory with the sequence to 9, but when White tries to catch the two black stones with 10, Black can block the ladder with 11. White must capture two stones, so Black will get two moves at the bottom.



Dia. 29





Figure 3 (8-14)

After Cho extended to White 10 in *Figure 3*, O approached with Black 11. White 12 broke the miai balance on the left side, so the 13-14 exchange became necessary.

Instead of 14 in *Figure 3*, White 1 in *Dia. 30* is not a good attacking move because Black can reinforce the left side by extending to A. Moreover, because the marked stone is far away, it is better to play tightly with White 14 as in the figure.



Dia. 30

Making the exchange of White 16 for Black 17 in *Figure 4* before the White 18-Black 19 exchange is related to a ladder in the upper left corner.






Figure 4 (15-20)

The ladder arises after Black 5 in *Dia. 31*. When White plays 6, the ladder runs right into the marked white stone, so Black cannot take the corner away from White. This sequence shows how deeply Cho is thinking about his moves.

The 18-19 exchange is also important. If White omitted it and pincer with 1 in *Dia. 32*, Black would attach at 2 and secure a position at the top with the sequence to 10. If White 1 were at A, Black would push up at B.



Dia. 31



Dia. 32

In summary, these exchanges enabled Cho to pincer with White 20 in *Figure 4* without having to worry about an immediate attack in the corner.





Figure 5 (20-30)


When Black defended the corner with 21 in *Figure 5*, extending down the side with 22 was the natural response. Black 23 was probably a bad move. The main fight was on the upper side. White attached with 24 and, after the exchange of Black 25 for White 26, White's corner in the upper left was absolutely secure. Black 27 was a big move,

but, after forcing with 28, White attacked the two black stones at the top with 30.




Dia. 33

O might have expected Cho to answer Black 1 with 2 in *Dia. 33*. The sequence might have continued to White 8 and Black would have established a position in the center and ended in sente. Ignoring Black 23, as Cho did in the game, and attacking with White 24 was a strong way of playing; White begins to get the advantage.



Dia. 34




Dia. 35

As I have already mentioned, the sequence from Black 24 to 26 secures White's corner. We saw one sequence in *Dia. 31* where Black could try to snatch the corner away from White. *Dia. 34* shows another. Black invades at 1 and, when White descends to 2, Black lives with the sequence to 7. White must play 6 to prevent Black from crawling along the second line and linking up with his stone on the left side.

However, if White has the marked stone in *Dia. 35* in place, Black can't link up, so, after Black 5, White can make a placement at 6 and destroy Black's eye shape. After White 8, the black stones are dead. Instead of White 24, however, simply

playing the marked stone is not forceful enough.

The hane of Black 25 in *Figure 5* was the correct response to White 24. If Black hanes from above with 2 in *Dia. 36*, Black must come back and defend the cutting point with 4, so he ends in gote. Next, White can jump to 5, aiming at the two marked stones at the top.



Dia. 36

Dia. 37

Standing at Black 1 in *Dia. 37* is also not good. Black ends in gote and White can secure the bottom corner with 2. In addition, this move aims at the sequence White A–Black B–White C.

The game continued with the moves to Black 33 in *Figure 6*. This concluded the first day's play and White 34 was the sealed move. Among the predictions for this move were A, B, and C. Where do you think Cho played? In the next issue, Cho's move and the rest of the game will be analyzed. In the meantime, we will conclude this article by looking at White A.





Figure 6 (30-33)

Black 1 in *Dia. 38* is a very big move, but White 2, engulfing the two black stones, takes even more territory. For this reason, Black ran away with 31 and 33 in the figure.




Dia. 38

Dia. 39

The problem with White 1 in *Dia. 39* is that Black 2 forces White to answer at 3, so White is reluctant to take this point.

White would prefer to play at 1 in *Dia. 40*, but this move is fraught with danger. Black might jump in with 2. The sequence would proceed to Black 6 and a swap would result: Black takes away White's corner and White captures the stones on the left side. Instead of 2, Black might turn at A, but then White would secure the corner with 3.




Dia. 40


Endgame Problems on 5x5 Boards (3)

by Fukui Masaaki 8-dan


Studying the endgame on the standard 19x19 board can be quite exhausting and involve complicated calculations as well as figuring out difficult sente-gote relationships. This is one reason why many amateurs do not devote as much time to the endgame as they should. On smaller boards, however, endgame study becomes more manageable. I believe that the ideal way for players to begin their study of the endgame is to start on a 5x5 board. The board is small enough so that all you have to do is to find the key move that wins. To this end I have composed more than 250 endgame problems for this size board. I give another twelve in this installment. Regard these problems as compositions that illustrate an endgame technique. They are not the result of actual play. In all problems, Black plays first and he must win by one point or more. A draw is considered a failure. Answers begin on the next page.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4




Problem 5




Problem 6




Problem 7




Problem 8




Problem 9



Problem 10




Problem 11



Problem 12


Answers to Endgame Problems



Problem 1

Failure


Black can atari with 1 and 3, but, if he does, he loses by one point after White captures with 4.



Problem 1

Black wins by one point.


The first-line atari of Black 1 is the tesuji. White must make eye shape with 4, so Black wins by one point.



Problem 2

Failure


Black 1 is an uninspired move. Black loses by two points after White descends to 2.



Problem 2

Black wins by one point.


The clamp of Black 1 is the tesuji. After White 4, Black wins by one point. If White 2 at 'a', Black plays 3, and White 'b' results in a ko. Since Black at 4 is a ko threat, White will lose all his stones.



Problem 3

Failure

After Black exchanges 1 for White 2, the result is a draw, since Black must capture the two stones on the left.




Problem 3

Black wins by one point.

5: at 1; 7: at 2


Black must throw in with 1. If White captures with 2, Black makes a ko threat with 3, then takes the ko with 5. White has no ko threat, so he must capture with 6. Black then connects with 7 and wins by one point.



Problem 4

Failure


Against Black 1, White plays 2 and 4. Black cannot omit Black 5 because of the threat of White 'a'. The result is a draw.



Problem 4

Black wins by one point.


Black 1, followed by 3, is the tesuji. Black wins by one point.



Problem 5

Failure


If Black plays 1 and 3, he loses by three points.



Problem 5

Black wins by two points.


Black 1 is a sneak attack from behind. After Black 5, White's group is alive in seki, but Black's group on the left has two points.



Problem 6

Failure


Against Black 1, White 2 becomes a forcing move. After Black 3, the result is a draw.



Problem 6

Black wins by two points.


Black should play his forcing move at 1 first. White must answer with 2 and Black 3 is the tesuji that guarantees Black's stones are alive.



Problem 7

Failure

Black 1 and 3 look like big moves, but, after White throws in with 4 and descends to 6, Black finds that his stones on the left are short of liberties. All his stones are dead.




Problem 7

Black wins by one point.

6: at 1


Squeezing with Black 1, 3, and 5 is the tesuji. The result is a seki, but in order to stop Black from making an eye, White must make two throw-ins, so he will lose by one point.



Problem 8

Failure


Black 1 certainly stops White getting a second eye, but, after the exchange of White 2 for Black 3, the result is a seki.



Problem 8

Black wins by one point.


Wedging in between the white stones with Black 1 is the tesuji. Black 3 is also a good move. After White 4, Black wins by one point.



Problem 9

Failure


Black 1 forces White to defend at 2, but Black 3 is a mistake. White 4 kills the black stones because Black can't fight the ko.



Problem 9

Black wins by one point.


Black 3 is the move that gives the black group eye shape. Black is now unconditionally alive.



Problem 10

Failure


Black 1 is the natural move, but you must know the follow-up. In answer to White's atari at 2, Black 3 is a mistake. White gets a seki with 4 and 6.



Problem 10

Black wins by three points.


Black 3 is the correct answer. White 'a' is not atari, so Black can block the seki with 'b'. If White captures two stones, Black can recapture White by throwing in at 1.



Problem 11

Failure 8: at 4


Against Black 1 and 3, White 4 is a good move because it gives White a ko threat at 6. Black must answer at 7 and, when White captures the ko, Black must capture with 9. The result is a draw.



Problem 11

Black wins by one point.


Simply falling back to Black 1 is the correct answer. Now when Black captures with 5, White has no ko threat, so Black wins the ko.



Problem 12

Failure

Black 1 is an uninspired move. White makes eyes with 2 and 4 and the result is a draw.




Problem 12

Black wins by two points.

Black creates a seki with the sequence from 1 to 5. White has no ko threats, so he can't start a ko. If White 4 at 5, Black plays at 'a' and gets a seki.


Answers to Life-and-Death Problems on Page 64

Problem 1



Correct


Correct. The hane of Black 1 is correct.



Continuation


Continuation. White can't play 2 at 3 because he is short of liberties. Therefore, he must capture with 2. But when Black connects at 3, the eye above 2 becomes a false one.

Problem 3



Correct


Correct. Black 1 is the vital point. White cannot play at 3; instead, he must play 2. After Black 3, White captures with 4. Next —



Continuation


Continuation. Black throws in at 5 and White is left with only one eye.

Problem 2



Correct


Correct. Black pushes in with 1, then throws in with 3. After White captures with 4 —



Continuation


Continuation. Black ataris with 5. White can't connect, so Black captures two stones.

Problem 4



Correct

Correct. If Black 1, White can't get a second eye. Against White 2, Black plays 3 and White can't play 'a'. If White 2 at 3, Black will play at 2.




Failure

Failure. If Black 1, White lives with 2 and 4.


Making Sabaki (2)

There are times when you will find your stones outnumbered in one part of the board, so you will not be able to make territory there. Your best course of action then is to simply make good shape, rich in eye potential, so that your stones, if attacked, can easily make eyes or escape. This technique is known as sabaki in Japanese. In making sabaki, sacrifices are not unusual and squeeze tactics are often used. Here are six more problems for you to contemplate and solve.




Problem 7

The marked stone is cutting Black into two groups. It seems as if he will have to lose his two stones at the bottom and cede the territory there to White. How should Black play?




Problem 8

How can Black wipe out White's moyo at the bottom?




Problem 9

The black stones are under severe attack. How can Black make sabaki?




Problem 10

White is developing massive influence in the center. How can Black turn the tables on White?



Problem 11


Black's six stones at the bottom are in trouble, but White has bad aji in the corner. How should Black play?



Problem 12


White's four stones in the top left are in trouble. How can they make sabaki?

Problem 7. Correct Answer




Problem 7. Correct Answer

The atari of Black 1 is the first move, but it must be followed up by casting a net with the knight's move of 3.




Dia. 1. Resistance

White will resist with 1 and 3, but Black calmly adds another stone to his group at the bottom. He then sacrifices these three stones and squeezes with 8, building a thick position in the center.



Dia. 2. Failure 1


The usual way to cast a net is to jump to Black 1, but, in this case, it fails. White is able to break out into the center with the sequence to 8.



Dia. 3. Failure 2


Defending the stones at the bottom with Black 3 also leads to a bad result for Black. White jumps out into the center in good form with 6, while Black is left with the burden of two weak groups to defend.

Problem 8. Correct Answer




Problem 8. Correct Answer

The white stones on the left are thin and clamping at Black 1 hits the vital point. If White connects at 2, Black peeps at 3, forcing White to connect at 4. Finally, Black plays the knight's move of 5, and the white stones are heavy and under attack.




Dia. 1. Variation

If White connects at 1, Black will peep at 2. After White 3, Black jumps to 4 and White again finds his stones under attack.




Dia. 2. Failure 1

Peeping first with Black 1 and 3 is the wrong order of moves. Black must connect at 5, which gives White the chance to jump to 6. This time it is the black stones that are under attack.



Dia. 3. Failure 2


Black 1 is not aggressive enough. It allows White to fix up his shape with 2, then jump out into the center with 4. This result is unsatisfactory for Black.



Dia. 3. Failure 3


Jumping to Black 1 is the worst move. White can fix up his shape with 2, robbing Black of a base. Black has failed to make sabaki.

Problem 9. Correct Answer




Problem 9. Correct Answer

Black must first atari on the left with 1 and 3, then atari on the right with 5. Next —




Dia. 1. The tesuji

When White extends to 6, Black pushes in with 7 and Black can capture two stones on the left or two on the right. Either way, Black will get a secure position at the bottom.



Dia. 2. The wrong order


Playing atari on the right with 1 first is the wrong order. White will, of course, extend to 2, but when Black ataris on the left with 3, White will turn at 4. This result is not satisfactory for Black.



Dia. 3. Failure


Black can certainly live at the bottom by connecting at 1 and descending to 3, but this is a negative way of playing.

Problem 10. Correct Answer




Problem 10. Correct Answer

Threatening the three white stones by casting a net with Black 1 is the tesuji. No matter how White answers he will end up with a bad position.




Dia. 1. Squeezing

If White breaks out with 2, Black squeezes with 3 and 5. Next —



Dia. 2. Continuation


After White connects at 6, Black extends to 7 and White is left with a heavy clump of stones. It is now Black who has thickness in the center and White must save his ten stones.



Dia. 3. Variation

5: connects below 3


If White tries to escape in the other direction with 1, Black can apply the same kind of squeeze with 2 and 4. Black has an excellent position after he extends to 6.



Dia. 4. Failure


The simple ataris of 1 and 3 are crude moves. Compare this position with the correct answer and you will see that Black's result here is inferior.

Problem 11. Correct Answer




Problem 11. Correct Answer

The hane of Black 1 is the tesuji. If White blocks at 2, Black cuts at 3. Next —



Dia. 1. Continuation


If White ataris with 4, Black ataris with 5, then descends to 7. White has to cut at 8 to save his stones, so Black can take the corner territory with 9.



Dia. 2. Variation


5: connects to the left of 1

White might atari with 1, but Black squeezes with 2 and 4, then connects with 6. The white stones are dead.



Dia. 3. The stone tower doesn't work.

In answer to White 1, descending to Black 2 is a useful tesuji to know. (See GW83: Problem 4, *Dia. 1* on page 50.) However, it doesn't work in this position. Black ataris with 4 and White captures with 5. Next —




Dia. 4. Continuation

9: connects at 6


Black throws in with 6 and squeezes with 8, but after he connects with 10, White can link up to his stones along the bottom with 11.

Problem 12. Correct Answer




Problem 12. Correct Answer

Jumping to White 1 is the tesuji. Black's two stones can no longer link up below, so he links up to the top with 2 and 4. Next —




Dia. 1. Continuation

White squeezes with 5 and 7, building a wall, with which he engulfs the lone black stone on the left. This is such a bad result for Black that he won't play 2 in the correct answer. Instead, he will probably escape into the center with his stone on the left. In any case, White 1 in the correct answer guarantees that White can make sabaki and settle his weak stones in the upper left.



Dia. 2. Failure 1

Against the atari of Black 1, White must not play 2. (Connecting with 3 in the correct answer is essential.) Black will push in with 3, then capture a stone with 5. White now has defects which he must repair before he can attack.




Dia. 3. Failure 2


White 1 is completely unreasonable. Black gets a big territory with the sequence to 6. This is clearly an unfavorable result for White.

The Throw-in Tesuji


The aim of the throw-in tesuji is to reduce the number of liberties your opponent's stones have. By using this tesuji, you can often gain the advantage in capturing races. Here are seven simple problems for you to solve. Black to play in all problems.




Problem 1
Black to capture some stones.




Problem 2
Black to capture some stones.




Problem 3
How does Black answer White 1?




Problem 4
Black to rescue his corner stones.



Problem 5
Black to save his marked stones.




Problem 6
Black to save his corner stones.




Problem 7
Kill the marked white stones!

Problem 1. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

Black throws in a stone with 1. If White answers with 2 —



Dia. 1


Black ataris four white stones with 3. The points A and B are now miai. That is, if White connects at A, Black can capture six stones at B; if White connects at B, Black can capture four stones at A.



Dia. 2


Without the throw-in, Black cannot capture any stones. For example, if Black plays 1 and 3, White has time to connect at 2 and 4. Since Black has failed to capture, his stones are dead.

Problem 2. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

In this position, Black must make two successive throw-ins: at 1 and at 3. After White captures with 4, Black descends to 5. Next —



Dia. 1


White must go after the three black stones with 6, but Black then plays 7. The points A and B are miai, so Black is able to capture some white stones.



Dia. 2


In answer to Black 5 in the correct answer, White cannot connect with 6 and 8 because he will lose his stones at the top when Black ataris with 9.

Problem 3. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

The throw-in of Black 1 forces White to capture with 2. After Black ataris with 3 —




Dia. 1

White must connect at 4, so Black links up to his stones on the left by capturing two stones with 5.




Dia. 2

If White connects with 4, he will suffer a big loss when Black captures with 5.



Dia. 3


This diagram should convince you of the effectiveness of the throw-in in the correct answer. If Black simply ataris with 1 and 3, White links up all his stones with 4 and the five black stones on the left are dead.



Dia. 4


White 1 in the problem diagram was a mistake. White should have simply descended to 1. This effectively kills the black stones on the left.

Problem 4. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

The throw-in of Black 1 forces White to capture with 2, but Black then plays 3, so White will lose six stones. That is —



Dia. 1


The points A and B are miai. If White connects at A, Black will capture at B; if White connects at B, Black will capture at A.



Dia. 2


The order of moves is important here. If Black first plays 1, White connects at 2 and all of his stones are safe. If Black 3, White 4 kills the black stones. Note how the throw-in in the correct answer reduces White's liberties and makes Black 1 an atari.

Problem 5. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

Descending to Black 1 threatens to link up along the top, so White descends to 2. But now the throw-in of Black 5 captures five white stones. Next —




Dia. 1

If White connects with 6, Black can atari with 7 and capture eight white stones.



Dia. 2


After the exchange of the marked stones, Black 1 is an unimaginative move. White can connect with 2, so the six black stones will be captured.



Dia. 3


To avoid losing any stones, White has to answer Black 1 by connecting at 2. But this allows Black to link up his stones at the top with 3.

Problem 6. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

The cut of Black 1 has the same effect as a throw-in tesuji. If White ataris with 2, Black ataris with 3 and 5. This position is similar to the one in the correct answer of Problem 5. Next —



Dia. 1


If White connects with 6, Black ataris with 7 and captures eight white stones



Dia. 2


Black 1 is uninspired. White connects at the vital point of 2 and the black stones in the corner are dead.

Problem 7. Correct Answer




Correct Answer

The throw-in of Black 1 forces White to lose a liberty by capturing at 2. After Black plays the atari of 3 —



Dia. 1

White must connect with 4. Next, Black plays 5 and ataris with 7, winning the capturing race by one move.




Dia. 2

If Black simply plays 1 (or 3) and plays out the capturing race, it will be White who wins it by one move when he ataris with 6.


An Introduction to Basic Josekis (3)

This series is aimed at players around 20-kyu. It is intended to give them an understanding of the most commonly played josekis and how they are applied in the fuseki. Each move in the joseki is analyzed and the reason it is played is completely explained.

Black's aim in playing the marked stone in *Dia. 1* is to maintain a high profile in the center. In response to the white approach at the marked stone, Black 1 shows his determination to make a thick position in the center. White has two responses: at 2 and at A. In our last installment we studied the White attachment at A. In this installment, we will show you what to do when White attaches at 2.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Before White attaches at 2 in *Dia. 2*, he has to consider a ladder (see *Dia. 3*). If it is unfavorable for Black, then Black will probably extend to 3 and White will secure the corner with 4 and 6. Black has achieved his objective of building a thick position in the center. After Black 7, White will crawl once to 8, while Black maintains his high profile in the center by extending to 9. This is the main variation of this joseki.



Dia. 3


This diagram shows the ladder. If it is favorable for Black, he will block at 2 in *Dia. 3* in response to White 1. If White cuts at 3, Black will force once with 4, then extend to 6. White defends with 7 and Black captures the stone at 3 in a ladder with 8.




Dia. 4

White could avoid the sequence in *Dia. 3* by capturing a black stone with 1. However, Black 2 forces White to capture with 3; Black then secures a large corner with 4. This is too big a loss for White to allow.

After 1 in *Dia. 5*, the move that Black must be careful about is White 2. It seems as if the two black stones at 1 and 7 are captured. However, none of White's three possible moves — A, B, or C — can succeed. Let's look at each of them.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

White 1 in *Dia. 6* looks like a strong move, but Black ataris with 2, then plays the sequence to 10. Next —



Dia. 7


White will link up underneath with 11 and 13 in *Dia. 7*. White captures three stones, but Black is very thick on the outside after 12. Note that in *Dia. 6* Black might be able to capture three white stones in a ladder. Even so, casting a net with Black 10 avoids any bad aji of a ladder block.



Dia. 8


Black has no problem with White breaking through with 1 and 5 in *Dia. 8*. He simply sacrifices two more stones and confines White to the right side with 6 and 8. This is the same position that was shown in *GW82*, on page 47 in *Problem 6*.

White might try to cover his defect by making the diagonal connection of 1 in *Dia. 9*. However, Black gets the advantage by playing the sequence to 6. It is now Black's privilege to play A and capture the two marked stones in sente. Black's profit in the corner is more than 15 points.



Dia. 9


White cannot resist Black 2 by blocking at 3 in *Dia. 10*. Black will make a placement at 4 and White's stones will be captured in a loose ladder as the sequence to Black 12 shows.




Dia. 10

Finally, let's look at White 1 in *Dia. 11*. Black first turns at 2, then ataris with 4. White extends to 5 and Black plays 6, threatening to capture two white stones by playing at A. Therefore, White turns at 7. But now Black plays 8, capturing two white stones in a ladder. The ladder is will most

likely be in Black's favor because it was a precondition for playing Black 2 in *Dia. 3*.)



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

White will want to link up his stones below to the ones above, so he plays 9 and 11. However, Black becomes very thick in the center when he captures with 10. Moreover, he still has sente.


In conclusion, when Black wants to play an influence-oriented game, he can usually get a thick position facing the center by playing the pressing move of 1 in *Dia. 1*. No matter on which side White attaches — at A or at 2 — he will have to resign himself to getting secure territory in the corner and plan on invading or erasing a black territorial framework later in the game.

Four Easy Life-and-Death Problems


Here are four easy life-and-death problems. If you are a dan-level player, you should be able to solve them on sight.




Problem 1
Black to kill White.



Problem 2
Black to live.



Problem 3
Black to kill White.



Problem 4
Black to kill White.

Answers on page 54.

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